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Abstract 
Events are central elements of human experience. Formally, they can be individuated in terms of 
the entities that compose them, the features of those entities, and the relations amongst entities. 
Psychologically, representations of events capture their spatiotemporal location, the people and 
objects involved, and the relations between these elements. Here, we present an account of the 
nature of psychological representations of events and how they are constructed and updated. 
Event representations are like images in that they are isomorphic to the situations they represent. 
However, they are like models or language in that they are constructed of components rather 
than being holistic. Also, they are partial representations that leave out some elements and 
abstract others. Representations of individual events are informed by schematic knowledge about 
general classes of events. Event representations are constructed in a process that segments 
continuous activity into discrete events. The construction of a series of event representations 
forms a basis for predicting the future, planning for that future, and imagining alternatives. 
 
 
What are the basic units of human experience? Objects are clearly central, and much research 
has been devoted to how they are represented by the mind and brain.1 Collections of objects 
form scenes, and scenes as well have also figured prominently in theories of perception and 
conception (see COGSCI-287). People are clearly important to human experience, but people 
feel like a special case—one can easily imagine life on a desert island with no other people 
around, but not life without objects or scenes. In addition to these fundamental aspects of 
thought, we believe that events are fundamental to human experience. They seem to be the 
elements that constitute the stream of experience, the things that are remembered or forgotten in 
autobiographical memory, and the components of our plans for future action. In this article we 
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develop a framework for describing and studying how the mind and brain represent events, and 
explore accounts of how ongoing activity is segmented into events. 
 We start with a review of an event semantics framework for thinking about situations and 
events. Then we introduce the concept of an event model as an actively-maintained 
representation of a current event, and describe how it relates to similar concepts. We 
characterize how such representations are structured and how, in their creation, continuous 
activity is segmented into events. This includes such ideas as events taking place in a spatial-
temporal framework, involving entities that have properties and various functional relations to one 
another. Along with this exposition we illustrate points with recent developments in the field of 
event cognition that support these ideas. Following this we provide some basic principles of event 
models, including incompleteness, flexibility, and relation to more general semantic knowledge. 
We then discuss how people update their event models to take in and handle new information. 
Finally, we present a discussion of more recent work on embodied cognition and perceptual 
symbol theories and the importance these hold for event cognition.  
Semantics of Situation and Events 
 In their book Situations and Attitudes (1983),
2
 Barwise and Perry provided a formal 
description of how events are structured as part of their theory of situation semantics. Here we 
concentrate on what they had to say about event structure. Their ideas are grounded in the idea 
that the world can be organized in a variety a ways, but only some of these are recognized by 
people. As such, the important elements and structure of an event are often, in some way, 
imposed by a person. There is presumably a reasonably high degree of uniformity across people 
in the way that they conceive of events. Thus, the components and structure of an event are not 
deterministically derived from the world itself. 
 In Barwise and Perry’s account, events have a number of important properties. The basic 
components of an event are individuals, the relations among individuals, their properties, event 
states, and spatiotemporal locations. These components are present in all events. Individuals can 
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either be considered as whole entities (e.g., Joe), or they can be broken down into parts in which 
each part is considered as an individual (e.g., Joe's arm). 
 There are three basic types of relational information in Barwise and Perry's theory. Binary 
relations capture the inter-relations among individuals and can capture actions among people, 
such as one person kicking another, or social and kinship relations, such as one person being 
another person's mother. Properties are a special class of relations that apply only to a single 
individual. Finally, situational states are relational information that captures general 
characteristics of the event, such as the fact that it is raining or that it is noon. 
 In addition to the different types of relational information noted above, events also are 
embedded in spatiotemporal locations. The time and place at which an event occurs serves as a 
framework for the event itself, constraining the individuals and relations and their configuration.  
 Barwise and Perry distinguished between two types of events: states-of-affairs and 
courses-of-events. A state-of-affairs is confined to a single spatiotemporal location, and thus is 
not dynamic. A state-of-affairs could be captured by taking a photograph. In contrast, a course-of-
events is a collection of states-of-affairs, and thus is dynamic. A course-of-events unfolds over 
time and space. For a course-of-events to occur, there needs to be some concept(s) in common 
across the states-of-affairs that serve to unify them. Individuals can serve as such invariant 
uniformities. 
Finally, Barwise and Perry distinguish between real and abstract events. Real events are 
parts of the world, whereas abstract events correspond to nonphysical domains, such as 
mathematics. From our perspective, under some circumstances, a common location may be 
generated not by an actual physical location, but by a virtual location. This virtual location is an 
abstract region that, when the two entities enter into it, allows them to interact with one another 
although there their physical locations would be recognized as being quite distinct. For example, 
a virtual location may be created when two people are having a conversation over the telephone, 
or when a protagonist thinks about another location.
3
Thus, locations can be conceptual as well as 
physical. 
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In sum, situation semantics proposes that events consist of entities that have features. 
Some of these features relate entities to each other. A state-of-affairs is a static configuration of 
entities and features that is localized in time and space. A course-of-events is a sequence of 
states-of-affairs that that unfolds over time, and is held together by some common attribute. 
Barwise and Perry refer to states-of-affairs and courses-of-events as two types of events. 
However, it is the second that corresponds to the psychological notion of event that we wish to 
characterize here. In the following sections we investigate how a sequence of states can be 
bound together into a coherent event.  
Modelpalooza 
 We are now ready to turn from events themselves to their mental representation. The 
literature uses a variety of terms to describe the representations people construct of real or 
imagined experiences. These can be summarized with the hierarchy illustrated in Fig. 1. At the 
broadest level is the mental model—a term introduced by Johnson-Laird
4
 and widely adopted by 
cognitive psychologists. For us, a mental model is a representation of a set of circumstances. 
This set of circumstances may or may not be tied to a specific event. As such, the term mental 
model is quite broad and general. Mental models can be divided into two classes: system models 
and event models. System models are mental models representing a functional system, such as 
how a mechanical device works, how a computer programmer processes information, or how a 
theoretical construct operates. System models themselves can be divided into two general 
classes
4
 These are physical system models, which capture our understanding of physical 
devices, such as a thermostat, a car engine, or a drawbridge, and abstract system models, which 
capture our understanding of systems that are either wholly abstract, such as theories of 
mathematics, or cannot be directly perceived, such as theories of subatomic physics. Other than 
noting their existence, we do not consider system models further. 
 Event models capture the entities and functional relations involved in understanding a 
specific state of affairs. This is in comparison to system models, which hold true across a range of 
circumstances. Event models can be derived from perceptual/motor experience, such as our own 
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interaction with the world, television, film, and virtual reality technologies, or from linguistic 
descriptions. Because event models derived from language have received extensive attention, we 
think it is helpful to distinguish these two cases. The term situation model was introduced by van 
Dijk and Kintsch
5
 to refer to event models derived from language. We use the term experience 
model to refer to event models derived from live experience. Some researchers working with 
narratives have taken as a working assumption that situation models derived from language 
share most of their properties with experience models.
6 
 Our focus here is on event models. 
Event Models  
Event models are multidimensional representations. Real world events are composed of 
different types of information that are inter-related in complex ways. As such, the mental 
representations of events should reflect this complexity. In this section we outline some of the 
major types of information that are involved in events. We draw heavily from previous work on the 
role of situation models in narrative comprehension and memory, in particular the event indexing 
model.
7,8
 
Spatial-temporal frameworks 
First, each event occurs in the context of a spatial-temporal framework that serves as the 
basis of an event model when it is created. Spatiotemporal location is a major organizing factor in 
memory for events. All animals that have been studied show generally poorer memory for events 
that are more distant in time.
9
 Although one might intuitively think that the temporal distance 
effects are due to the decay of memory traces, the evidence suggests that they are mostly due to 
differences between the spatiotemporal frameworks at encoding and retrieval. When the 
conditions of retrieval match those of encoding memory is good and when they mismatch 
memory is bad. 
We distinguish between three types of spatial information: labels, locations, and relations. 
A spatial label is simply the name given to describe a location, such as "Wrigley Field," "The 
White House," or "Slovakia". Spatial labels are property information.  
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The spatial location itself defines where the event unfolds. This could be a physical 
location, such as a room, a park, a city, or an abstract location, such as a conference call, a web 
site, or a virtual environment. The centrality of spatial location to events is clear. Many studies of 
event cognition focus on either spatial knowledge itself, or the impact of spatial information on 
other cognitive processes. 
Spatial relations involve the spatial interrelations among objects in an event. To illustrate 
this, consider the sentence “The boy was next to the tree in the park.” The term “park” is the label, 
the park itself is the location, and the boy’s being next to the tree is a spatial relation. However, it 
is possible for people to treat spatial relations as a means to define subregions within a larger 
spatial context.
10 
 
It is also important to note that it is possible for event models to be “viewpoint” dependent 
to some degree. That is, the model may be experienced or “read” based on a particular 
perspective from within the model. This viewpoint may be based on the perspective in which the 
information was originally learned, such as whether a space was experienced from a survey 
(birds-eye view) or route perspective.
11,12
. Recent work on embodied cognition has also 
demonstrated an influence of such perspectives on an event. For example, in a study by Borghi, 
Glenberg & Kaschak,
13
 people were asked to verify attributes of an item. The speed with which 
they verified those attributes varied as a function of whether the perspective. For example, if 
asked to verify information about a car’s steering wheel, this was done faster if one had the event 
perspective of being in the car as compared to being outside of it. Finally, the influence of event 
perspective can be seen in the difference between field and observer autobiographical 
memories.
14
 Field memories are memories that convey the field of view a person had when the 
event was actually experienced. In contrast, observer memories are those in which a person can 
see one’s self in the event, which is, in some sense, inaccurate remember because one rarely 
sees one’s self during an event unless it involves a mirror, television camera, or some such. The 
fact that people can have both field and observer memories suggests that there is some flexibility 
in the perspective that one takes on an event model. 
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For an event model to be constructed, a spatial location needs to be specified or inferred. 
When explicit information about a location is given, such as its label, or can be easily inferred 
from the context, then an event model will use that location for the framework. However, if little or 
no information is given, then a person may establish a general “empty stage” which serves as the 
location information for the event model framework.
0
 For several pieces of information to be 
integrated into an event model a person must be either explicitly told or must infer that the same 
location is involved.  
The importance of spatial locations is reflected in the finding that certain brain regions 
seemed to be specialized for processing location frameworks. As one example, the 
parahippocampal place area (PPA) has been reported to be more active when people are looking 
at pictures of locations as compared to pictures of faces or objects.
16,17
  
The temporal framework is the period of time in which an event is unfolding. Like space, 
time is important for events. In many cases a time frame is defined by the activities carried out by 
the agents involved in a spatial-temporal framework
18
, as well as how a person is parsing up the 
passage of time
19
. Activities that occur at different times are unlikely to be considered to be part 
of the same event, unless there is some unifying relationship, such as a causal one. For example, 
if someone sets a trip wire at one time, and then a person walks across it at some later point in 
time, this can be considered a larger, extended event with a larger temporal separation between 
the two sub events
20
. However, in general, a discrepancy in time is likely to cause the information 
to be attributed to separate events. Two entities in a common location are less likely to be part of 
the same event if they were in that location at different times. For example, if a tiger were in the 
same room as a zookeeper, it would be inappropriate for us to draw the inference that the tiger is 
going to tear the poor zookeeper to shreds if we also know that they were in the room at different 
times. So, for an event model to be constructed, temporal location needs to be explicitly specified 
or inferred. 
The duration enclosed by a time frame can vary widely depending on the actions or 
relations that are involved. For example, a telephone call from a telemarketer would comprise 
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somewhere from a few seconds to a few minutes, but a vacation could be anywhere from several 
days to several months.
18
 In many situations, one may not have detailed information about the 
duration of an event, such as Japanese tea ceremonies and a train trip from Amsterdam to 
Rotterdam
.21 22
 Moreover, the exact boundaries of a temporal frame may be more or less fuzzy. 
An inning in baseball or a courtroom trial session each has a precise beginning and ending, but 
an afternoon of reading or a dorm party may not. 
 Although time and space are primitives in the sense that they are both necessary for the 
creation of an event model framework, there are important differences. First, spatial location is 
typically more restrictive in defining an event than is time frame. For example, knowing that a set 
of events took place in the emergency room of a hospital provides more of a constraint than 
knowing they took place on Thursday between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. As such, we expect 
spatial framework information to be used more during comprehension and to serve as a better 
retrieval cue during memory retrieval, and research on autobiographical memory suggests that it 
does.
23
 
 Second, spatial location is less likely to be redundant with other information. For example, 
if you know a person is eating at a restaurant, you know general information about the location, 
but you don't know the exact restaurant they are at; information that can have a profound impact 
on understanding the event. There are no obligatory spatial markers that locate an event in space 
relative to the place of utterance. In contrast, temporal framework information is more likely to be 
redundant with knowledge of the activity, and is more likely to be linguistically marked, as with 
verb tense. Furthermore, time frames can be localized within a larger time line using temporal 
relational information. That is, an event can defined relative to others or the current time. 
 Third, space is symmetric whereas time is not. There is nothing special about Joe’s being 
East of the tree rather than West, or right rather than left. However, for Joe to leave the bank 
before the robber arrived is very different than for Joe to leave the bank after the robber arrived. 
Entities and Properties 
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 The entities in an event are often what are of most interest to people. A great deal of 
event processing is oriented around them. For example, a person may want to know what the 
moods of another person are, how do they relate to the other people in the situation, what their 
goals and desires are, etc. This property information is bound in the event model to the token 
standing for the entity. 
 Entity tokens are the points at which event models make contact with causal relations. To 
understand an event it is important to know how the entities involved both are the sources of 
causation and are affected by other sources of causation. As such, the degree to which an entity 
requires or is involved in linking relations influences its importance in an event model. Entities that 
are highly connected are more likely to be represented, whereas those that have little to no 
bearing are unlikely to be well integrated into the model.
24,25,26,27
 
 Associated with each entity is a collection of properties that identify it, such as its name, 
physical characteristics, internal characteristics (e.g., emotions and goals), and so forth. 
Information about properties can be directly associated with the entity. However, not all properties 
are stored in the event model. Those properties that are causally relevant are more likely to be 
stored. Property information that is important, but not directly relevant may be stored in the event 
model, but may also be kept out and only be stored in a more generalized representation where it 
can be called upon as needed. 
 A basic property of an entity is its name or identity. While this is a seemingly central 
aspect of an entity, the name does not need to be specified in the model. For entities that recur 
across many different events, this information may be stored in a referent-specific way and be 
accessed as needed. For other entities, a specific name or identity is unnecessary. For those 
entities, a token is present in the model and is not identified, but serves as a place-holder. For 
example, if you know that Bill stood in line at the movie theatre, the model may contain tokens for 
the people ahead and behind him in line. However, the identities of these people are left 
unspecified. For those entities that are not identified, if the context is sufficiently constraining, and 
the identity information is needed to understand a structural or linking relation, then identity can 
  10 
be inferred. For example, if a person is told that Bill is getting a root canal, one can infer with a 
high probability that a dentist is the one giving it to him. 
 Another type of property associated with an entity is its physical characteristics. These 
can include things such as size, color, texture, shape, and so forth. This is in line with perceptual 
symbol theories of cognition (see below) that assume that people use mental representations that 
incorporate and depend on perceptual qualities. Again, as with most other entity properties, these 
characteristics are less likely to be incorporated into a model unless they are important to 
understanding the functional structure of the event. 
 While some entity properties have a perceptual quality, others are internal to the entity, 
and would not be perceptual per se. This can include things such as physiological state or health. 
Probably one of the more interesting internal properties is a person’s emotions. Emotions are 
important because they often provide a source of impetus for actions and provide a source of 
causal explanation for why people act the way they do. It is clear that people use emotions to aid 
comprehension.
28,29,30,31
 Non-living things also have internal properties. For example, a car may 
have a dead engine or a cabin may be warm or cold inside. 
Goals are an important internal property of entities that serve as agents.
32,33
 A goal is a 
state of affairs that an entity acts to bring about. They are related to desires, needs, and 
motivations. Goals may be caused by desires or needs. For example, a person who desires a 
martini or needs water to prevent dehydration may adopt the goal of ingesting a beverage. 
However, desires and needs can be distinguished from goals because it is possible to have the 
former without the latter. A castaway on a desert island may desire a television but not adopt the 
goal of obtaining one because it is futile. Because desires and needs cause goals and goals 
cause behaviors, goals allow us to understand the actions of others. 
Structural Relations and Linking Relations 
Often what makes an event unique is not the space and time that it occurred, nor the 
entities involved, but the relations of the entities to one another, the location they are in for that 
event, or time at which that particular event is occurring relative to others. Relational information 
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provides the unique structure for an event apart from the specific identity information assigned to 
the other elements. 
 There are two types of relational information. One is structural relations that specify the 
inter-relations among entities. These can be either within a given time frame, such as the spatial 
arrangement of objects, or more stable characteristics, such as the layout of a building. Some 
examples of structural relations are spatial relations, ownership relations, kinship relations, social 
relations, etc. 
Spatial relations are structural relations that convey the spatial configuration of entities 
within an event. However, while a spatial framework is needed for event model creation, spatial 
relation information is not. Instead, spatial relations are more likely to be ignored unless (a) the 
person has a goal of learning this information, (b) there are enough processing resources to 
devote to this information, or (c) the information is functionally or causally important to 
understanding the situation.34   
Another important point about spatial relations is that they help define a framework from 
which other aspects of the event are interpreted. Franklin and Tversky
35
 describe a set of spatial 
relations that locate objects relative to one’s body. One critical feature of their account is that 
these reference directions are anisotropic. For example, whether something is up or down relative 
to the body is more accessible than whether it is left or right.
 35
 Moreover, these spatial 
frameworks can vary with respect to the perspective a person takes, such as whether a person 
reading a narrative takes a first-person or third-person perspective on the events being 
described.
36
 
 The other type relation is linking relations that serve to link different events into a 
sequence or collection. The most common types of linking relations are temporal and causal 
relations. Temporal relations convey when a given event occurs relative to others, rather than 
providing an absolute time period. Causal relations provide information about a causal chain of 
events.  
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 Causal relations are central for cognition. For example, when placed in classical 
conditioning situations, people often try to make a causal attribution,
37
 even if their behavior is 
actually guided by mechanisms that do not take causality into account. That said, people do not 
always draw causal connections between two pieces of information. For example, in a study by 
Fenker, Waldmann, and Holyoak,
38
 people judged the causal relationship between two words 
(e.g., spark, fire). Responses were faster when the cause preceded the effect than the reverse. 
However, when people judged whether two words were associated, and did not make a causal 
judgment, this pattern was not observed. Still, overall causality is central to event model 
construction. 
 Causal relations involve a temporally ordered dependency because causes precede their 
effects. Further, causal relations require an event model with at least two spatial-temporal 
frameworks. The first includes the cause and the second the effect. For example, consider “The 
rocket launched the satellite into orbit.” An event model capturing this requires a spatial-temporal 
framework whose spatial location is the launch pad and whose temporal frame is earlier, and 
another whose spatial location is earth orbit and whose temporal frame is later. Thus, causal 
relations are a part of extended, dynamic event models.  
 The degree to which information is part of a causal chain can influence whether it is 
interpreted as being part of the same or a different event. Information that is causally unrelated is 
more likely to be stored in separate models. In contrast, information that can be interpreted as 
being part of the same causal chain is more likely to be interpreted as being part of the same 
event.
39
 
 Causal relations may also influence other aspects of a situation model. Information that is 
relevant to the causal chain is more likely to be encoded than other information.
34,40 
 For example, 
knowing that an open beach umbrella provides shade from the sun, or that a magnifying lens 
dropped in dry grass can cause a fire, increases the probability that these spatial relations will be 
encoded. Information that is relevant to the causal structure of an event model is said to be 
functionally relevant. 
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Basic Principles  
In this section we outline some basic principles of event models. The aim of these 
principles is to provide a guide to how event models are constructed and operate in cognition. 
What kind of information do they contain, and what kind of information are they unlikely to 
contain? How do they relate to other types of knowledge? 
 The first of these principles is that event models capture important characteristics of 
events in a ways that are functionally parallel to a real situation. “Functionally parallel” means 
there is a second order isomorphism
41
 between the representation and the thing represented. For 
a second-order isomorphism there is a one-to-one mapping between modeled events and 
possible events, and this mapping preserves similarity relations. For example, if one reads that 
two poker players sat down at a table one might construct an event model with tokens for the 
players. One might then read that either one more player or two more players joined the first two. 
The number of players is represented in the event model in a functionally parallel fashion with the 
resulting representation being more similar for the one-more-player case than the two-more-
player case. The nature of the similarity is not determined: The number of players could be 
represented (for example) by the firing rate of a population of neurons or by the particular 
population of cells that are activated. Second-order isomorphism can be contrasted with a first-
order isomorphism in which a representation is a physical reproduction of the actual stimulus. In 
that case, there would have to be a physical token for each poker player in the nervous system, 
and adding a player would require adding a token. Second-order isomorphism also can be 
contrasted with representations based on arbitrary relations. For example, if the number of poker 
players were represented using English numerals, then the representation of two poker players 
(“2”) would be no more similar to the representation of three players (“3”) than the representation 
of poker players (“4”). 
 The second principle is that although event models are isomorphic to the events they 
represent, they are not full-blown and complete replicas of them. Instead, a model contains 
information relevant to understanding the basic structure of the event and little more. That is, they 
may include components that are sketchy in a similar way that a drawing may be incomplete or 
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have elements that are occluded. Because event models are partial representations this gives 
them a degree of flexibility in terms of the number of possible event configurations that they could 
conform to. For example, when reading a novel and then seeing a movie adaptation, the 
incompleteness and flexibility of the event models created during reading allow one to map this 
information into one’s experience of the movie and allow one to recognize it as the same basic 
story. Perhaps one reason many of us find that movie adaptations do not live up to the books on 
which they are is that the event models created while reading retain a greater element of 
flexibility. (In addition, there are details that can be conveyed by text that are difficult, if not 
impossible, to convey by film.) Note well that incompleteness is different from abstraction, 
although it can facilitate abstraction. For example, if one has visited a certain bar on a number of 
occasions, on returning one may be reminded of those previous occasions. Sketchier event 
models may facilitate this reminding if they capture the features common to the repeated 
instances, such as the location and the selection of beers on tap, while omitting the features that 
vary from instance to instance such as one’s clothes and companions.  
 Event models are not holistic representations. Instead, they are componential. One can 
see this by studying how event models are constructed. It appears they must be constructed 
piece by piece, and this process can be time consuming and effortful. This was clearly shown in a 
study by Zwaan.
42
 In this study, people read narratives. Half of them were told that these were 
newspaper articles (describing real events) and half were told that these were works of literature 
(where the focus is on the language itself). Later testing measured memory for three levels of 
representation: the surface form of the text (the exact wording), the specific facts or propositions 
asserted by the text, and the situation described by the text, including implications and 
assumptions not explicitly asserted. As can be seen in Table 1, people in the literary condition 
remembered the surface form better than those in the newspaper condition, suggesting they 
processed the details of the wording more thoroughly. People in the newspaper condition, on the 
other hand, had stronger situation model memory, suggesting a more thorough encoding of the 
events.As can be seen in Table 1, people in the newspaper condition had poorer memory for the 
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surface form, but better situation model memory. In comparison, people in the literary condition 
had better memory for the surface form, but poorer situation model memory. 
 
Table 1. d’ scores for the various levels of representation in the study by Zwaan42 (standard deviations in parentheses).  
  
 Surface Form Propositions Situation 
Model 
Newspaper -.05 (.54) 1.20 (.74) .66 (.80) 
Literary .27 (.42) 1.46 (.90) .14 (.71) 
 
Different groups of comprehenders may have habitually different model construction 
habits. For example, Stine-Morrow, Gagne, Morrow & DeWall
43
 (see also Radvansky et al.
26
) 
found that on initially reading a story, older adults had relatively better memory for the situation 
model compared to the surface structure of the text, whereas younger adults had relatively better 
memory for the surface structure. On a second reading, older adults filled in more of the surface 
structure whereas younger adults filled in more of the situation model. This show that the richness 
and completeness of one’s event model may vary depending on one’s momentary 
comprehension goals and based on one’s habits of understanding. 
Referent specific knowledge 
 Events are unique. As such, each event model should, for the most part, stand for a 
single event. However, despite the ultimate uniqueness of events, there are elements that 
transcend a single event. Our knowledge about the commonalities across a set of events is a 
form of semantic knowledge, and the knowledge structures that store it are referred to as event 
schemas. Whereas event models represent particular events (instances), event schemas 
represent classes of events (types). The concept of an event schema
44, 45
 is related to the more 
specific notions of script
46
 and structured event complex.
47
 Unless we are referring to the 
specifics of one of these constructs we use the more general term “event schema.” 
 Event schemas are helpful when a person needs knowledge to understand stereotypical 
aspects of an event to either fill in unmentioned, but highly likely components for which a person 
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has a large knowledge base. Our view is similar to that of the schema-pointer-plus-tag model of 
schema processing.
48, 49, 50, 51
 In our view, pan-event information about specific referents is stored 
in a referent specific memory apart from the event model. Moreover, non-relevant aspects of an 
event are not directly represented in a model, but it may contain a pointer indicating that 
information is stored elsewhere. This is especially true for minor and peripheral aspects of an 
event. For example, for a model of the events in a house, rather than containing information 
about all of details of each room, the model may contain pointers to such knowledge. 
Segmentation 
Suppose that you work in an office, and on arriving one morning you stop by the 
mailroom where you have a conversation with a colleague, then walk down the hall to the lounge 
and pour yourself a cup of coffee. Most theories would suppose that you formed two event 
models, one for the mail-checking event and one for the coffee-serving event. People naturally 
segment ongoing activity into events at such points, producing segmentations that are reliable 
across observers and within observers over time.
Error! Reference source not found.47, 53
 But how are these 
events individuated? Gibson
54
 held that events are individuated in virtue of invariant 
spatiotemporal patterns that persist throughout the duration of an event. This works nicely for 
simple physical events—for example, the event of a ball being dropped and bouncing is unified by 
the dynamics of bouncing under gravity that persists throughout the bouncing.
55
 However, to date 
no one has offered an account of the individuation of everyday events—those involving people 
and goal-directed actions—in these terms, and it is not clear that such an account is possible. For 
events of this sort, Event Segmentation Theory (EST)
56
 offers an account of how continuous 
ongoing activity is segmented into events. Here, we give a brief summary of EST. Other 
introductions are presented in Kurby & Zacks
57
 and Zacks & Sargent,
58
 and the full theoretical 
account is given in Zacks et al.
 56
 
 EST begins with the presupposition that observers attempt to predict the near future as 
an ongoing part of perception. Perceptual processing transforms sensory inputs to elaborated 
representations that include predictions. This processing is influenced by event models. Event 
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models bias the perceptual processing stream, allowing the comprehender to fill in missing 
information and disambiguate ambiguous information. For event models to be effective, they must 
for the most part be shielded from the vicissitudes of the sensory input, holding a stable state in 
the face of missing, ambiguous, or partially conflicting information. Thus, while checking mail 
one’s event model continues to represent the location of your mailbox, even if it is temporarily 
occluded by a colleague leaning down to retrieve her or his own mail.  
To be effective, event models also must be updated from time to time. If not, one will be 
afflicted by perseveration—a mail-checking event model that held over to into a coffee-serving 
event could lead one to misinterpret a drawer of silverware as a mail slot. But how to update 
event models at just the right time, without an external signal cuing what the events are, or even 
that a new event has begun? EST proposes that event models are updated in response to 
transient increases in prediction error. At some point as you leave the mailroom and head toward 
the lounge, things are likely to become less predictable. You walk through doors, encounter 
different people and objects, see new causal sequences and goals in progress. EST claims that 
when prediction error increases comprehenders update their event models based on the currently 
available sensory and perceptual information. In most cases the new event model will be more 
effective than the old one and prediction error will decrease as the system settles into a new 
stable state. This process is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
In the example of arriving at work, checking mail, and getting coffee, the comprehender 
experiences the activity in the flesh and is also a participant. However, one may hypothesize that 
the same mechanisms apply when the comprehender is a passive observer, and apply whether 
the events are experienced through sight, sound and touch or through reading. EST further 
proposes that people simultaneously maintain event models on multiple timescales. At a fine 
temporal grain, prediction error is integrated over a relatively brief temporal window, and brief 
increases in prediction error lead to updating. At coarser grains, prediction error is integrated over 
longer windows and more sustained error spikes are needed to produce updating. Updating will 
tend to be hierarchical, such that coarse-grained updating rarely occurs without simultaneous 
fine-grained updating. 
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What is the evidence for these proposed mechanisms? Behavioral and 
neurophysiological data provide evidence that people construct a string of event models during 
perception and reading. In perception, passive viewing of events produces transient increases in 
brain activity at event boundaries.
59, 60
 Similar results have been observed during reading.
61, 62
 
Converging results come from the finding that observers tend to slow down at event boundaries
63
 
and at those points at which changes that may produce event boundaries occur.
64, 22
 There is also 
evidence that viewers
65
 and readers
63, 66
 update memory representations at event boundaries. 
For example, in one recent study Swallow and Zacks & Abrams
65
 presented viewers with clips 
from professional cinema that had been segmented by a previous group of viewers. From time to 
time the clips were interrupted and the viewers’ memory for recently presented objects was 
probed. In all cases the objects had last been seen exactly 5 s previously. However, when a new 
event had begun during those intervening 5 s, information in working memory was rendered 
much less available. (There was also evidence that information which had been encoded into 
long term memory was slightly more available.) 
These memory findings support the general proposal that event models are updated at 
event boundaries. They also raise the more general question of how event models are updated, 
to which we now turn. 
Updating 
There are four general ways the contents of an event model can be updated. The first is 
that a new model is constructed (model creation). Second, information may be incorporated into 
an existing event model (model elaboration). A third possibility is that an existing model is altered 
to accommodate new information (model transformation). A fourth possibility is that information is 
stored in two or more models, but then it becomes apparent that they refer to the same situation. 
This information is combined into a single model (model blending).  
 Model creation is the simplest case. For example, in the structure building framework of 
discourse comprehension,
67
 model creation occurs because the reader detects that incoming 
information in a text is relatively unrelated to the previous information. This could occur, for 
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example, if the protagonist moves from one location to another or if a new character enters the 
scene. In EST,
56
 model creation occurs as the result of a transient increase in prediction error. 
 Event model elaboration is also a relatively straightforward. There are two basic types of 
model elaboration. The first is the addition of new information that was not included in a prior 
version of the model, but that does not involve any change other than the addition of new 
components. For example, suppose a person creates a model to represent the event “George 
was sitting on a bench in the park."  Later the person learns that “George was wearing green 
overalls.” This information can be added to the model without changing any of the prior contents. 
In this case, property information is added to the token for George to indicate that he is wearing 
green overalls. Alternatively, elaboration may also occur when information is removed from a 
model and this removal does not alter other contents of the model. This information would not be 
involved in the functional, temporal, causal, or intentional relations among the entities in that 
event. 
 Model transformation occurs when some aspect of a prior model needs to be altered 
because of the new information. It is probably the most complex type of updating. The changes 
involved are not minor in that there is likely to be some change in the functional, temporal, causal 
or intentional relations among entities. These changes are not so drastic that a new model is 
needed, but more processing is needed than with model elaboration because the structure of the 
situation has undergone some meaningful change. Model transformation occurs when there has 
been a major change in an event, but it is still interpreted as being part of the same course of 
events. For example, a shift to a new spatial-temporal framework along a causal chain would 
correspond to model transformation. Alternatively, the introduction of a new goal or subgoal for a 
person would also correspond to model transformation. 
 The structure building framework
67
 assigns a major role to model elaboration. As a reader 
proceeds through a text, new information is continuously mapped into the current situation model. 
Similarly, in Kintsch’s construction-integration theory,
68
 new information is incorporated into a 
model if it is associated to current information in the model. Importantly, associations allow 
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information not explicitly mentioned to be incorporated. EST
50
 departs significantly from these 
accounts in assigning a smaller role to model elaboration. Specifically, EST proposes that model 
elaboration occurs primarily immediately after model creation. Here is why: When a spike in 
prediction error occurs, the input gates on an event model are opened briefly, and then close over 
a brief window. As a result, elaboration ceases quickly the content of an event model is 
dominated by information encountered at the beginning of an event. EST makes this proposal for 
the sake of parsimony; whereas the structure building framework has two distinct mechanisms for 
shifting and model elaboration, EST makes do with only shifting. At first glance, it may seem 
counterintuitive that model elaboration should cease shortly after event model creation. However, 
patterns that appear like continuous event model elaboration can be approximated if the 
comprehender updates finer-grained event models while maintaining a coarse-grained event 
model. 
 The final kind of updating process, blending, occurs when information has been stored 
across two or more models, and the person realizes that it pertains to the same event.
4
 In this 
case, these separate models are blended together to form a new, integrated model. This blending 
occurs through an alignment of information along the relevant dimensions. For example, if a 
reader reads that the protagonist of a story has crossed from one room to another, the reader 
may form two separate models. If the reader then learns that the activities in the two rooms form 
one unified causal sequence, the two models may be unified into a single model. This blending 
process is critically important in theories of logical reasoning.
 4
 
 Model creation, model elaboration, model transformation and model blending all should 
have unique behavioral signatures.  Specifically, elaborating a model should lead to high 
availability of the elements just added to the model, but should not lead to large increments in 
processing time or decreases in the availability of prior information. Model transformation should 
lead to major increases in processing time because more of the event model is being changed. 
Furthermore, elements of the event model that were relevant prior to the updating may become 
less available. Finally, model blending should reveal behavioral signatures of two events now 
being treated as one. For example, this may result in a reduction in interference that was present 
  21 
before, with the person moving from having to coordinate two event models, to having the 
information integrated in one. To date almost no research has been to assess whether and when 
each of these forms of updating occurs. 
 In sum, there are a number of ways an event model may be updated. At one extreme, 
event models may be formed from whole cloth and rebuilt each time an event boundary is 
encountered. This is parsimonious but could be inefficient, insufficient, or both. At the other 
extreme, event models may be incrementally updated, revised, and combined. This is flexible and 
powerful—but perhaps too flexible and powerful, robbing event models of their explanatory force 
in cognitive theories. An important challenge for future research is to pin down what sorts of 
updating event models undergo. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have tried to describe the nature of event models, the sort of structure 
they may have, and how they may be created and updated during online processing. The major 
components of an event model include the spatial-temporal framework, the entities involved in the 
event, as well as important or salient properties they may have, structural relations among entities 
in an event, and linking relations among events. New event models are created when the 
components of the current model no longer apply to the experienced situation. A possible 
mechanism for identifying such points is the monitoring of prediction error. Event models may be 
updated after they are created or simply replaced, and the relative role of each of these is 
currently unclear. 
Events are a fundamental aspect of cognition. They give our thoughts and action purpose 
and are the basis of our intelligent understanding of the world. How we conceive of and represent 
events allows us not only to predict the likely future, and plan effectively, but also to imagine new 
possibilities. By better understanding how people conceive of and use their knowledge of events, 
we can be better positioned to identify when prediction, planning, and imagination will be more 
effective, and when they will have difficulty. 
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